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Foreword 
Against a backdrop of heightened uncertainty, 
Scotland’s economy has continued to grow, albeit 
below trend. This, combined with near all-time high 
employment, is to be welcomed and provides some 
positives in these extra-ordinarily testing times.
However, Scotland continues to face a productivity 
challenge with the consequent impact on real 
earnings growth. As the Commentary evidences, the 
economic growth we have seen has been matched 
by an increase in hours worked rather than an 
increase in productivity. If we want to see a rise in 
real earnings and living standards, we need to see 
productivity grow. 
The fragile level of productivity and earnings growth 
means devolved tax revenues are forecast to grow 
more slowly, with a subsequent impact on Scottish 
Government budgets. This quarter’s Commentary 
points to that budgetary pressure, explaining that 
while Scottish taxpayers are paying £500m more 
than they would if they were rUK taxpayers, the 
Scottish Government will only collect £180m more in 
2019/20. The difference is accounted for by weaker 
earnings growth.
With uncertainty the new norm, particularly in 
light of another Brexit extension, the challenge for 
businesses is how to respond and prepare for the 
future. 
Increased investment should help to improve 
productivity. However, this quarter’s Commentary 
also shows business investment has fallen for 
four quarters in a row, while Deloitte’s latest CFO 
survey1 shows that businesses are continuing to 
build their cash balances and delay investment.
Like our Q4 2018 CFO Survey, the latest edition 
continues to demonstrate a definite ‘hunkering 
down’ mentality across the UK’s CFO community. Key 
findings include a predicted decline in revenues, a 
focus on cost pressures and tighter credit conditions.
Approximately 80% of CFOs said they expected 
the long-term business environment to be worse 
as a result of leaving the EU which has led to firms 
tightening spending and planning to scale back on 
recruitment. There is also a diminished appetite for 
capital expenditure and M&A.
While this cautious business climate is 
understandable, as the Commentary shows, there 
remains a wide range of outcomes possible. It will 
be important for businesses to continue to consider 
that range of outcomes, to remain agile and be able 
to take advantage of the opportunities that do arise. 
Scotland has many economic strengths on which 
it can build. However, in a world where uncertainty 
appears to be the new normal, it is unlikely that 
continuing with the same approaches as before will 
do. As our UK-wide Growth Power Up report identified 
late last year, there is a need for a bolder and more 
collegiate approach – one which ensures resilience 
but is also ambitious by applying greater innovative 
and tactical thinking to carve out medium-term 
strategies that deal with the future economic and 
fiscal challenges.  
There is a pressing need to encourage investment 
and to improve productivity. There is no doubt this is 
a significant challenge. However, with the economic 
strengths we have, a determination to capitalise on 
the opportunities that will arise while supporting 
people to enhance their skills, encouraging 
innovative thinking and improving collaboration in 
key sectors, we should be confident we can rise to 
the challenge.
John Macintosh 
Tax Partner
Deloitte
April 2019
Deloitte supports the production of the Fraser Economic Commentary. It has no control over its editorial content, 
including in particular the Institute’s economic forecasts.
1 Deloitte’s Q1 2019 CFO survey gauges sentiment among the UK’s largest businesses in the wake of Parliament’s rejection of Mrs May’s Brexit deal. 
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failure of the House of Commons to agree a new plan and the start of Brexit talks between the government and the Labour Party. 
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Growth in the Scottish economy remained steady 
over the course of 2018.
Employment is close to a record high, with 
unemployment at a record low. 
But productivity and earnings growth remain weak, 
and there are signs that the recent divergence in 
economic performance between Scotland and 
the UK is feeding through into some devolved tax 
revenues.  
Of course any growth in the current climate is 
welcome, particularly given the uncertainty that 
surrounds the UK’s exit from the EU. 
As a result, all economic forecasts need to be 
viewed with caution. We simply do not know how 
decisions in Westminster or Brussels will pan out. 
Nor do we have any precedent to fall back on to give 
guidance on what the economic impacts might be. 
Moreover, the smoothness, or otherwise, of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU is but one step in the 
process. Negotiations on the terms of our future 
relationship with the EU have yet to fully begin. 
In the light of all this, we present a series of 
scenarios for how the Scottish economy may 
evolve over the next three years.
As with any such scenarios, the exact decimal 
point estimates are less important than the overall 
scale and direction of travel.  
In our central forecast, we continue to assume 
that the UK makes an orderly departure from the 
EU at some point in 2019, although uncertainty 
continues to impact on investment and private 
sector spending decisions for the foreseeable 
future. In light of weaker recent data, and the 
decision to grant an extension to October 31st, we 
 
Summary
have lowered our forecast a little to 1.1% for 2019 
and 1.4% and 1.5% for 2020 and 2021 respectively. 
Whilst the immediate risk of a ‘no-deal’ outcome 
has been reduced, it remains a possibility at some 
point in 2019. To illustrate this, we have developed 
– like the Bank of England – a ‘worst’ case scenario 
of a disorderly Brexit. In this scenario, Scotland 
would enter a recession.  
Of course, in such an instance policymakers would 
react and seek to offset some of this immediate 
shock to the economy. 
It is also possible to envisage a more optimistic 
scenario, where uncertainty is reduced and 
confidence returns over the coming months. In 
such an instance, growth could surprise on the 
upside and be closer to trend in 2019 and 2020. 
One consequence of Brexit is that it has left little 
room for discussions of the emerging structural 
challenges and opportunities our economy is 
facing. The delay to October is only likely to make 
this worse.  
Next month will mark 20 years since the first 
elections to the devolved Scottish Parliament.
Despite progress in some areas, the growth 
challenge is arguably still something that remains 
inadequately addressed in the political discourse 
in Scotland.
Those who established the Scottish Parliament 
had the hope that it would usher in a new era of 
collective effort and decision making. 
With Brexit marking the most significant structural 
change – for good or bad – in our economy in over 
40 years, the need for that approach is now more 
crucial than ever.
 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
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At a glance
2019 2020 2021
GDP 1.1% 1.4% 1.5%
Production 1.2% 1.6% 1.7%
Construction 1.0% 1.1% 1.1%
Services 1.1% 1.4% 1.4%
Table: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth (%), 2019 – 2021, 
central forecast based on orderly departure
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Chart: Scottish growth (since 2014) – year and quarter Table: Employment & unemployment rates, Dec - Feb 2019
Table: FAI forecast Scottish labour market indicators - central 
forecast based on orderly departure
Employment (16-64) Unemployment (16+)
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Scotland 75.6 Ÿ 3.3 ź
England 76.4 Ÿ 4.0 ź
Wales 75.5 Ÿ 4.5 ź
N. Ireland 71.2 Ÿ 3.0 -
UK 76.1 Ÿ 3.9 ź
2019 2020 2021
Employment rate (%) 75.1% 75.0% 74.8%
Unemployment Rate (%) 3.8% 3.9% 4.1%
Central forecast
Due to uncertainty around possible Brexit outcomes, 
ZHKDYHGHYHORSHGDUDQJHRIGLŎHUHQWVFHQDULRV0RUH
information can be found in the ‘Our forecasts’ section.
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Outlook and Appraisal
The lack of Brexit clarity continues to cast a shadow over the outlook for the Scottish economy. Whilst the 
immediate risk of a no deal outcome has been removed  for now  the remaining outcomes remain as 
far apart as ever. Despite this, the Scottish economy continues to grow, albeit at a relatively slow pace. 
Chart 1: Scottish growth (since 2013) – year and quarter %
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Table 1: FAI forecast growth scenarios, %, 2019 to 2021
2019 2020 2021
Business Investment unlocked 1.7% 1.8% 1.6%
Central Forecast 1.1% 1.4% 1.5%
No deal max policy response -0.2% -0.3% 1.3%
No deal no policy response -2.1% -1.5% 1.4%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 2: 10, 20 and 30 year average Scottish growth rates, 1973 
- 2018
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Introduction
Growth in the Scottish economy was steady – if 
unspectacular – in 2018. This was in line with our 
own forecast, where our modelling in late 2017 
suggested growth of 1.4% in 2018. Chart 1. 
This weak growth was mirrored across the UK. 
Indeed, new FAI modelling estimates that Scotland 
was the fastest growing part of the UK outside of 
London in 2018.  
But the outlook continues to be dominated by one 
issue: Brexit. The range of outcomes seems as 
wide as ever. To illustrate this, rather than just our 
forecast, we have produced a number of scenarios.  
We provide a ‘worst case’ scenario through to a 
more optimistic one where there is a swift resolution 
to the UK’s departure. We believe that it is important 
to provide the full range of scenarios, both positive 
and negative. Table 1.
,QWKHZRUVWFDVHWKHUHLVDVLJQLŏFDQWFRQWUDFWLRQ
in the Scottish economy in the second half of 2019 
(with a peak to trough of 5.5%, leading to growth in 
2019 of -2.1%). However, this assumes no policy 
response from the  Government or the Bank of 
England, which is not very realistic. 
Assuming that there is a response, output still 
contracts, but much less so than in the worst case 
scenario, and soon picks up after that (a peak to 
trough contraction of 1.9%, leading to growth in 
2019 of -0.2%).
There is also a more positive scenario where 
XQFHUWDLQW\LVUHGXFHGDQGFRQŏGHQFHUHWXUQV
perhaps if a deal is agreed. In this case, we think 
that growth could surprise on the upside, with 
growth of 1.7% in 2019.
We said in our previous commentary that, whatever 
the outcome of Brexit, it was likely that critical 
elements may simply be fudged, or more openly 
deferred, leaving uncertainty for many more months, 
if not years. Unfortunately, nothing has happened in 
the interim to change that view.
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Table 2: OECD growth rates: 2017 (outturn) to 2020
2017 2018 2019 2020
UK 1.7 1.4 0.8 0.9
US 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.2
Japan 1.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
Canada 3.0 1.8 1.5 2
Germany 2.5 1.4 0.7 1.1
France 2.3 1.5 1.3 1.3
Italy 1.7 0.8 -0.2 0.5
Euro Area 2.4 1.8 1.0 1.2
World Growth 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.4
Source: OECD 
Chart 3: OECD business and consumer confidence indices, Feb 
2010 - Feb 2019
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Chart 4: Loss of momentum in global economic growth
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The global economy
The general slowdown in global growth that we 
GLVFXVVHGLQWKHODVWFRPPHQWDU\KDVLQWHQVLŏHGLQ
recent months. 
Most major economies are now expected to grow 
more slowly in the next couple of years than they did 
in either 2017 or 2018. Table 2.
In recent days, the IMF have cut their growth 
forecasts warning that “While the global economy 
continues to grow at a reasonable rate and a global 
recession is not in the baseline projections, there 
are many downside risks.”  
There are a number of reasons for this. 
Firstly, overall sentiment indicators across advanced 
and emerging economies have weakened since the 
autumn, suggesting fading momentum in global 
growth. Chart 3.
There have been a series of disappointing economic 
indicators over the past 3 months that have shown a 
similar picture in the US, China and in Europe.
Italy has re-entered recession, whilst Germany 
narrowly avoided following suit. Chart 4.
To an extent, this was always going to happen 
following a period of above trend growth, and talk of 
a ‘global recession’ – at this stage – is overblown. 
6HFRQGO\WKHVLJQLŏFDQWŏVFDOVWLPXOXVLQMHFWHGLQWR
the US economy by President Trump’s tax cuts has 
VWDUWHGWRZHDURŎ
Thirdly, uncertainties over the longer-term health 
of emerging markets – most notably whether or not 
China’s years of rapid growth are coming to an end 
– have injected a new wave of uncertainty into the 
RXWORRNDQGŏQDQFLDOPDUNHWV
Finally, the ongoing threat of trade skirmishes 
between the US and China has weakened forecasts. 
On top of this, a mix of weakening emerging market 
growth, coupled with trade uncertainties, has 
already had a negative impact on international trade 
ŐRZV
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Chart 5: Who Trades?
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Chart 6: Average Tariff Rates
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Table 3: WTO Negotiation Rounds
Round Period Number of countries
Geneva 1947 23
Annecy 1948 13
Torquay 1950 38
Geneva 1956 26
Dillon 1960-61 26
Kennedy 1964-67 62
Tokyo 1973-79 102
Uruguay 1986-93 123
Doha 2001-? 164
Source: WTO
The threat to international trade prospects remains 
one of the greatest risks and uncertainties to global 
growth prospects over the longer-term.
)RUWKHEHVWSDUWRIŏYHGHFDGHVWKHJOREDO
economy had experienced a steady and sustained 
rise in international trade. Much of this trade had 
been concentrated in a small number of countries, 
but in recent years new markets have started to exert 
JUHDWHULQŐXHQFH&KDUW
This was supported by a gradual reduction in the 
barriers to trade, particularly between the world’s 
PDMRUWUDGLQJSDUWQHUV$YHUDJHWDULŎUDWHVIHOO
sharply, and remain low by historical standards. 
Chart 6.
However, in recent times, political and economic 
instability – both localised and global – has created 
a more uncertain outlook. 
The term ‘slowbalisation’ has been coined to 
GHVFULEHWKHUHFHQWŐDWOLQLQJLQJOREDOWUDGH
patterns, and rising protectionist sentiment. And 
it is not just trade that has been impacted. Cross-
border investment has fallen sharply in recent times. 
Part of the explanation for this is likely to be short-
term domestic policy agendas, which are likely to be 
temporary in nature. 
%XWLWLVDOVROLNHO\WRUHŐHFWDPRUHVWUXFWXUDOVKLIW
in attitudes to globalisation, particularly as the 
EHQHŏWVRIHYHUFORVHULQWHJUDWLRQKDYHQRWEHHQ
shared equally. 
It is also the result of being unable to come to any 
form of agreement on the core remaining barriers 
WRWUDGHVXFKDVQRQWDULŎEDUULHUVRQWHFKQRORJ\
health care, intellectual property etc. The lack of any 
HŎHFWLYHPXOWLODWHUDOWUDGHGLVFXVVLRQVLQFHLV
a case in point. Table 3.
Boosting levels of international trade is crucial for a 
small open economy like Scotland. In January, new 
export statistics were published for Scotland. 
These showed that international exports from 
Scotland rose by £1.9 billion – or 6.2% – between 
2016 and 2017. Note that this is in nominal terms; 
in real terms the growth was just 0.5%.
Boosted by the competitive value of the pound 
and strong growth in Europe during 2017, the 
improvement in Scottish exports was driven by a 
£1.7bn (13.3%) increase in exports to the EU. 
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Chart 7: International trade as a percentage of GDP, 1960 – 
2016
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Chart 8: Growing Markets - non-eu export growth becoming 
increasing large share of Scottish international exports
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Chart 9: International exports by market size, 2017
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Whilst positive, the Scottish Government did miss its 
target to grow exports by 50% by 2017 (on a 2010 
baseline), with growth of only around 35% instead. 
And overall, trade as a share of our economy have 
slipped back in recent times – in contrast to the UK 
and global economies. Chart 7. 
The uplift in EU exports somewhat reverses a trend 
we had been seeing in recent years where the 
growth in international exports had been driven by 
markets outside the EU. Chart 8.
Back in 2002/03, Scottish exports to the EU were 
around 56% of total international exports, today the 
ŏJXUHLV
7KHODWHVWŏJXUHVVKRZWKDWIRURYHURI
Scotland’s international exports are to EU markets.
Indeed, EU exports of £14.9bn are – on their 
own – nearly as much as Scotland exports to 
North America, Central and South America, the 
Middle East, Asia, Africa and Australasia combined 
(£15.1bn). Chart 9.
And of Scotland’s Top 10 export destination 
countries, 8 are in the EU and a further country – 
Norway – is part of the European Economic Area and 
therefore the Single Market.
Of course, the exact scale of risk to Scottish exports 
from Brexit remains uncertain. Exports will still 
continue but on what scale? Will the impact be 
PLQLPDORUVLJQLŏFDQW"
$QGFRXOG%UH[LWóGHSHQGLQJXSRQWKHŏQDOGHDO
– provide opportunities to explore new trade deals 
with other countries?
But we must be realistic. It is simply not possible to 
unwind integrated trading patterns overnight. 
)RUPDQ\FRXQWULHVWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIWDULŎVRUQRQ
WDULŎEDUULHUVZLOOPHDQWKHGLŎHUHQFHEHWZHHQEHLQJ
able to sell and compete in EU markets and not. 
Trade deals with other countries are possible, but 
little can match the scale or accessibility of the EU 
Single Market.
It is against this backdrop that the Scottish 
Government will publish its new Export Action Plan.
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Chart 10: EU exports as a percentage of GDP, 2017
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Chart 11: Exports by market for Ireland, Denmark and Scotland 
as a percentage of GDP, 2017
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Table 4:  Scotland’s five largest exports, 2017
Sector International 
exports (£ million)
Percentage 
of all exports
Food and drink 5,855 18.0
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities
3,670 11.3
Refined petroleum and 
chemical products
3,485 10.7
Mining and quarrying 1,940 6.0
Retail and wholesale 1,890 5.8
Total 16,840 51.9
Source: Scottish Government 
6FRWODQGKDVVLJQLŏFDQWH[SRUWVWUHQJWKVLQD
number of markets, most notably food and drink, 
energy related sectors and professional and 
ŏQDQFLDOVHUYLFHV
But there is scope for improvement. 
As a share of our economy, Scotland exports less 
than many comparable countries within the EU
Including UK exports, Scotland has a ratio of 
exports to GDP of around 53%. But this falls to 20% 
when looking only at international exports. This 
compares to EU and OECD averages of 45% and 28% 
respectively. Chart 10.
Overall, Scotland’s export base remains relatively 
narrow. This is not unusual in a country of Scotland’s 
size, but it does seem to be an issue that is more 
pronounced here. 
For example, according to data from HMRC Scottish 
UHJLVWHUHGŏUPVDFFRXQWIRUMXVWXQGHURI8.
registered exporters – below a per capita share. 
At the same time, Scotland depends much more 
upon one market (i.e. the rest of the UK) as a 
destination for its exports than many other small 
countries. Chart 11.
:KLOVWMXVWŏYHVHFWRUVDFFRXQWIRURYHUKDOIRI
all Scottish international exports, with whisky 
DFFRXQWLQJIRUDVLJQLŏFDQWSURSRUWLRQRIWKDW 
Table 4.
With limited resources, and levers at its disposal, in 
its export strategy the Scottish Government will need 
to develop a robust evidence based approach that 
moves beyond high level targets and ambitions of 
‘internationalisation’. 
Tough decisions will be required on what businesses 
WRRŎHUVXSSRUWWRóHJLVWKHIRFXVXSRQDVPDOO
QXPEHURIŏUPVDOUHDG\H[SRUWLQJEXWFRXOGGR
PRUHGHFHQWVL]HGGRPHVWLFŏUPVWKDWFRXOGH[SRUW
but currently do not, or the large volume of smaller 
ŏUPVZKRGRQRWH[SRUWEXWLIWKH\ZHUHZRXOGGRVR
on a small scale?
What sectors should policy help support? And what 
markets should be targeted?
What practical steps should be taken, and how 
VKRXOGGLŎHUHQWLQLWLDWLYHVEHHYDOXDWHG"
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Chart 12: UK GDP Growth, 2008-2018
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Table 5: Breakdown of UK GDP growth rates by month 
November 
2018
December 
2018
January  
2019
GDP 0.2% -0.4% 0.5%
Index of services 0.3% -0.2% 0.3%
Index of 
production
-0.3% -0.5% 0.6%
Manufacturing -0.1% -0.7% 0.8%
Construction 0.1% -2.8% 2.8%
Agriculture 0.5% 0.4% -1.3%
Source: ONS
Chart 13: Economic performance of broad sectors of UK 
economy since 2012
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The UK economy
7KH8.HFRQRP\VORZHGLQWKHŏQDOWKUHHPRQWKVRI
2018, with growth of just 0.2%. Growth was always 
expected to be subdued in light of the ongoing 
Brexit uncertainty, but also following on from the 
VWURQJJURZWKZLWQHVVHGRYHUWKHVXPPHUDVRQHRŎ
HŎHFWVIURPWKHZDUPZHDWKHUDQGWKH:RUOG&XS
unwound. 
The weakening global outlook discussed above 
has also not helped. As a result, growth in the UK 
continues to remain below trend, with the economy 
up just 1.4% over the year – compared to a longer 
term growth rate of closer to 2.5%. Chart 12
The ONS’ new monthly GDP series provides a useful 
insight into the current performance of the UK 
economy. Table 5. Whilst the series can be volatile, 
it does suggest that the reason for the weak growth 
was a contraction of output in December, with 
growth bouncing back in January. Table 5.
It is highly likely that the outlook over the coming 
year will change on a monthly or even weekly basis, 
as and when uncertainty impacts bite, withheld 
investment comes on stream and/or stockpiling 
takes place. 
Recent growth was once again driven by services, 
with output up 0.5% over the quarter. However, 
annual growth for 2018 was 1.6% – the weakest it 
has been since 2010.
3URGXFWLRQRXWSXWGHFOLQHGE\LQWKHŏQDO
three months of the year, with manufacturing 
contracting in 3 of the 4 quarters in 2019 and by 
0.9% over the year. Chart 13. 
Transport equipment – most notably car production 
– has been particularly badly hit. A recent survey 
by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders 
reported that UK car production fell 18.2% in 
WKH\HDUWR-DQXDU\UHŐHFWLQJDGHFOLQHLQ
domestic and foreign demand. 
As we have discussed in previous commentaries, a 
feature of the UK economy – and one that appears 
to have been exacerbated since the EU Referendum 
– has been the weak performance of business 
investment. Business investment has now fallen for 
FRQVHFXWLYHTXDUWHUVWKHŏUVWVXFKLQVWDQFHVLQFH
2009. This is despite the economy growing and 
employment rising. 
11 Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 14: Business investment in previous UK recessions and 
recoveries
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Chart 15: Non-dwellings investment in the G7, Q2 2016 - Q4 
2018
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Chart 16: Capacity utilisation (%) in UK manufacturing
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0RVWFRPPHQWDWRUVEHOLHYHWKDWWKLVUHŐHFWVDQ
LQFUHDVLQJQXPEHURIŏUPVGHOD\LQJLQYHVWPHQW
in response to Brexit uncertainty. The Bank of 
(QJODQGöVLQWHOOLJHQFHJDWKHULQJSRLQWVWRŏUPV
holding back on capital spending (with the scale 
of the investment being postponed increasing). 
Further evidence of a Brexit impact can be seen by 
FRPSDULQJWKHSDWKRILQYHVWPHQWVLQFHWKHŏQDQFLDO
crisis with previous UK recessions. Chart 14.
It appears that businesses have held back on capital 
spending at a point in the cycle where previous 
historical episodes would point to a pick-up. This 
coincided with the EU Referendum. Cumulative 
growth since the referendum has also been 18 
percentage points lower than the Bank of England 
were forecasting in Spring 2016.
Although weaker global growth may be a factor, it 
is unlikely to explain all of this marked weakness. 
UK business investment growth has lagged its 
peers for a period of time. Chart 15. Whilst business 
investment makes up a small component of 
aggregate demand, it is crucial for productivity and 
boosting long-term growth capacity.
All this comes at a time when most indicators point 
WRŏUPVRSHUDWLQJZLWKOLPLWHGVSDUHFDSDFLW\DQG
who normally should be investing). Chart 16.
As a result, the output gap – i.e. how close the UK is 
to operating at its ‘potential’ level – remains small. 
This suggests that even with growth being weak in 
recent times, there may not be as much scope for 
UK growth to pick-up materially in the medium term. 
Chart 17.
Chart 17: Output gap – actual vs. potential output – is 
estimated to have closed with UK economy near capacity
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Chart 18: UK unemployment rates, 1971 onwards
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Chart 19: Number of vacancies in the UK, 2001 to 2018
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Chart 20: UK regular average weekly earnings growth: 3-month 
on a year ago
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2QHŐLSVLGHRIŏUPVKROGLQJEDFNRQLQYHVWPHQW
is that the demand for labour continues to remain 
high. 
In the three month period to January 2019, UK 
unemployment was estimated to be just 3.9%. Chart 
18.  It has not been lower since November 1974 to 
January 1975. It remains well below the EU average 
unemployment rate of closer to 6.5%. 
At the same time, the UK employment rate is at a 
record high (of 76.1%), whilst economic inactivity is 
at a record low (20.7%).
Whilst high employment rates are welcome, there 
are concerns that the UK labour market has become 
less ‘dynamic’ than in the past with less progression 
and movement between employers. At the same 
time, vacancies continue to rise. Chart 19. 
In normal times, this would provide an ideal climate 
for investment. But as highlighted above, this is not 
happening. 
The high employment rate, coupled with high 
vacancy rate, is putting some (weak) upward 
pressure on earnings. Chart 20. 
At the start of 2019, average weekly employee 
earnings – excluding bonuses – were estimated to 
be rising by 1.4% in real terms. 
But the combination of weak economic growth and 
continued increases in employment meant that 
productivity continues to lag behind. Chart 21.
Productivity in Q4 2018 – output per hour – 
remains 18.3% below its pre-downturn trend. Or, 
equivalently, productivity would have been 22.5% 
higher had it followed this pre-downturn trend.
Chart 21: Productivity per hour trend, Q1 1994 - Q4 2018
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Chart 22: CBI measures of confidence, Q1 2015 - Q1 2019
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Chart 23: Purchasing Manager’s Index for the UK, Jan 2016 - Mar 
2019
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Chart 24: Deloitte CFO survey - % of CFOs who rate external 
uncertainty facing their business as higher or very high
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UK economic outlook
The mix of a weakening global economic outlook, 
coupled with Brexit uncertainty, has led to a 
VLJQLŏFDQWVKLIWLQPRVWLQGLFDWRUVRIFRQŏGHQFHDQG
activity in the UK economy. 
7KH&%,öVLQGH[RIEXVLQHVVFRQŏGHQFHIHOODJDLQ
– for the 2nd quarter in row – to -23 (from -16 in 
Q4 2018). This is its lowest reading since the 2016 
EU referendum. In particular, there was a marked 
fall in sentiment around export prospects with 
ŏUPVQHUYRXVWKDWWKHRQJRLQJWXUPRLOPD\LQKLELW
opportunities to secure future orders. Chart 22
The UK PMI for services fell to 48.9 in March – recall 
a value above 50 marks expanding activity; a value 
below 50 marks contracting activity. This was the 
ŏUVWFRQWUDFWLRQVLQFH&KDUW
Against expectations however, the same PMI for 
manufacturing jumped up from 52.1 in February to 
LQ0DUFK5DWKHUWKDQDULVHLQFRQŏGHQFHLW
would seem that this followed an increase in stock-
piling (see below).  
It should be noted however, that surveys do not 
always provide a full-proof picture of current trends 
in the economy. For example, in the immediate 
aftermath of the EU referendum, virtually all 
business surveys pointed to a marked immediate 
slowdown in the economy. This turned out not to be 
the case. 
It is possible that in times of uncertainty, the link 
between surveys – particularly around measure of 
õFRQŏGHQFHöóDQGDFWXDOGD\WRGD\DFWLYLW\LVQRW
perfect. 
8QFHUWDLQW\KDVLQWHQVLŏHGUHFHQWO\VRLWLV
important to exercise caution when interpreting 
survey responses. 
The latest Deloitte CFO Survey uncertainty index 
shows that more than half of CFOs continue to rate 
current levels of uncertainty as high or very high. 
In addition, the survey shows that risk appetite 
remains close to a nine year low and that revenue 
expectations remain depressed. Chart 24.
A common theme throughout all surveys is that 
investments remain notably below their long-term 
averages, with spending on buildings, plant & 
machinery, training and innovation all expected to 
be lower in the year ahead. 
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Chart 25: Investment intentions, BoE agents 2006 - 2019
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Chart 26: Contingency Planning for ‘no-deal’ Brexit
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Chart 27: Purchasing managers index of materials purchased for 
inventory at factories, Index, March 2015 - March 2019
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A recent survey by the Bank of England found that 
investment intentions for the next 12 months fell 
sharply in manufacturing. This was the lowest rate in 
nine years. Chart 25. 
Contacts mostly cited Brexit uncertainty as the main 
reason, with some choosing to build cash reserves. 
Some, particularly those with overseas owners, said 
that investment was being diverted outside the UK. 
In the main however, most surveys also report that 
there could be a rebound in investment if a Brexit 
deal was agreed.
In previous commentaries, we have cited the 
DSSDUHQWODFNRISODQQLQJIRU%UH[LWDPRQJVWŏUPV
+RZHYHULWLVFOHDUWKDWWKHUHKDVEHHQDVLJQLŏFDQW
increase recently. Chart 26.
For many companies, preparing for Brexit will involve 
holding higher than normal levels of stocks of 
VXSSOLHVRUŏQLVKHGJRRGV,QUHFHQWVXUYH\VWKHUH
has been a sharp increase in stock-piling. Chart 27 
shows the outcome for inventories of raw materials, 
contrasting the UK with other G7 countries. Prior to 
2019, the highest this index had reached was 55. 
It is within this environment that the OBR published 
their latest outlook for the UK economy in March. 
Like the Bank of England, the OBR are now 
forecasting that the UK economy will grow more 
slowly this year than they thought back in the 
Autumn. Along with the Bank, they are forecasting 
growth of 1.2% in 2019 before growing by 1.4% in 
2020 and 1.6% in 2021.
Chart 28: Evolution of OBR Spring forecasts 
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Scottish Economy Dashboard
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 Ł 2XWSXWZDVŐDWIRUFRQVWUXFWLRQIRUDVDZKROH
which was the poorest year of growth since 2012
 Ł $JULFXOWXUHIRUHVWU\DQGŏVKLQJKDVKDGDZHDN
following a strong 2017, contracting throughout 
the second half of the year, (in part due to weather 
conditions).
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 Ł The retail and wholesale sector held up well in 2018. But 
VLJQLŏFDQWWURXEOHVUHPDLQIRUWUDGLWLRQDOUHWDLOHUV
 Ł Rising wages across the economy could give respite to a 
VHFWRUJRLQJWKURXJKVLJQLŏFDQWVWUXFWXUDOchanges
 Ł A strong year for accommodation and food services,      which was one of the best performing sectors in services
 Ł Tourist facing elements of the sector continue to do well
 Ł Future post-Brexit challenges will include recruitment
 Ł There was steady growth in this sector throughout the  
quarter and the year
 Ł 7KHVHFWRULVQRZŏQDOO\EDFNDERYHSUHFULVLVKLJKV
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 Ł &RQŏGHQFHDQGJURZWKKDVUHWXUQHGUHFHQWO\ZLWKD
strong performance in 2018. In particular,  growth in 
computer products, food and drink, and petroleum 
products has boosted growth
 Ł ([SRUWHUVFRQWLQXHWREHQHŏWIURPZHDNSRXQG%XW
remains most at risk from dislocation of UK-EU trade
Key issues/trends
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 Ł  Sector continues to grow strongly – and is now at its 
highest ever level 
 Ł Growth potential is high, although boosting productivity in 
sector will be key for sustainability
 Ł Future post-Brexit challenges could include ‘just-in-time’ 
deliveries and access to migrant workers
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Chart 29: Year and quarter contributions to Scottish GDP, Q4 
2018
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Chart 30: Scottish GDP per head vs UK from 2015
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Chart 31: 10, 20 and 30 year average Scottish growth rates, 1973 
- 2018
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The Scottish economy
7KH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\JUHZE\LQWKHŏQDO
quarter of 2018, slightly faster than the UK as a 
whole (which grew by 0.2%). 
Over the course of 2018 as a whole, the Scottish 
economy grew by 1.4%. 
Growth was driven by relatively strong growth in 
production activities (up 2.0% over the year) – 
including in manufacturing (which grew by 2.8%) 
– and steady growth in services (up 1.4% over the 
VDPHWLPHSHULRG&RQVWUXFWLRQDFWLYLWLHVZHUHŐDW
Chart 29.
Growth was relatively strong over the quarter in both 
services (up 0.5%) and construction (up 0.8%). 
In contrast, production output fell by 0.9%, driven 
largely by a fall back in electricity and gas supply. 
7KLVUHŐHFWHGLQSDUWWKHSDUWFORVXUHRI+XQWHUVWRQ
power station following safety concerns.
Two things are apparent from the most recent data. 
Firstly, with growth continuing at broadly the same 
pace as throughout 2017 and 2018, there does not 
yet appear to be too much of a direct feed through to 
WKHRőFLDOGDWDIURPDQ\%UH[LWXQFHUWDLQW\DWOHDVW
at an aggregate level) just yet. 
Secondly, the data continues to show that growth 
continues to lag behind over the longer-term. 
The gap that opened up with the UK in 2015 – 
during the height of the downturn in the oil and gas 
sector – has not closed to any great extent. Chart 30. 
Of greater concern however, is the downward trend 
in core growth rates for Scotland. Chart 31. 
The rolling 10, 20 and 30 year average growth rates 
for Scotland are now at their lowest level since the 
early 1970s.
Long-term data shows that Scottish growth averaged 
DURXQGLQWKH\HDUVSULRUWRWKHŏQDQFLDO
FULVLV,QWKH\HDUVVLQFHWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV
Scottish growth has yet to reach that level in any 
year. 
17 Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 32: Oil and gas production volumes, million tonnes of oil 
equivalent, 1998 - 2017
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Chart 33: Extra-regio (oil and gas) activity as a share of the 
Scottish economy, %, 1998 - 2017
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Chart 34: Change in output of Scottish sectors, %
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One particular challenge that the Scottish economy 
has had to face in recent times was the downturn in 
the oil & gas sector in 2015 and 2016.
Oil production from Scottish waters peaked in 
1999, with natural gas production topping out in 
2002. Since then, production levels for both fossil 
fuels have been on a sustained decline – although 
in recent years production has increased ever so 
slightly. Chart 32.
As the North Sea enters its mature phase of 
operation, with production more and more 
FRQFHQWUDWHGLQVPDOOHUDQGKDUGHUWRUHDFKŏHOGV
the contribution of the industry to Scotland’s overall 
economic footprint has fallen. Chart 33. 
Oil and gas output produced on the UK Continental 
Shelf does not directly enter most Scottish economic 
VWDWLVWLFVLQFOXGLQJWKHRőFLDO*'3HVWLPDWH%XW
WKHŏUPVWKDWVXSSRUWVXFKDFWLYLW\GRHQWHUWKH
Scottish series. This includes those servicing oil and 
gas production outlets, those in the supply chain 
DQGEXVLQHVVHVWKDWEHQHŏWIURPWKHVSHQGLQJRI
people employed in the industry. 
Chart 34 shows the percentage change in output 
across the main sectors of the Scottish economy 
over 2015-2016 compared with 2017-2018. 
Production activities fell sharply – by nearly 8% 
during the height of the downturn. Metal industries 
fell 20%. There has been little bounce back.
Aberdeen was at the centre of this with economic 
activity and employment taking a hit in the city. 
Chart 35. Indeed, looking at the other parts of the 
country, employment continued to rise across major 
cities, but fell in Aberdeen. 
Chart 35: Annual sectoral employment change in Aberdeen City
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Chart 36: Employment and unemployment, Scotland 
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
ra
te
 (%
)
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
ra
te
 (
%
)
Employment (LHS) Unemployment (RHS)
Source: ONS, LFS
Chart 37: Median pay by gender
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Chart 38: Full time and part-time employment growth, Index 
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Scottish labour market
The Scottish labour market continues to post 
impressive headline numbers. The employment rate 
is near its historic high and unemployment is at its 
record low. Chart 36. 
Whilst positive, the experience of those in work is 
not foremost in most policymaker’s minds when 
reciting thee positive statistics verbatim. 
60% of working-age adults in Scotland in relative 
poverty (after housing costs) were living in working 
households, up 12%-points on two decades ago.
One reason for this is that despite expanding 
employment opportunities, wage growth has been 
extraordinarily weak. For example, median pay fell 
LPPHGLDWHO\IROORZLQJWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLVDQGKDV
stagnated since. Chart 37. 
Another reason is that work for many has become 
less secure. Underemployment, zero hour contracts, 
temporary working, and self-employment have at 
GLŎHUHQWWLPHVDOOEHHQIHDWXUHVRIWKHSRVWFULVLV
labour market. Chart 38 & 39.
We can see the fragile economic environment 
UHŐHFWHGWRVRPHGHJUHHLQWKHWUHQGVIRULQFUHDVHG
part—time working, particularly among men and 
in the increase in the employment rate of those 
over the state—retirement age. Economic necessity 
appears to be pulling more people into the labour 
market. 
This in turn appears to explain the lack of dynamism  
in the labour market, with those in work choosing to 
stay put in their roles.
Chart 39: Employment and self-employment growth, Index 
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Chart 40: Scottish labour productivity growth, Q1 2016 - Q3 
2018
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Chart 41: Drivers of Scottish labour productivity - GVA vs. hours 
worked (inverted)
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Chart 42: Changes in Scottish productivity since 1998
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Productivity
A common theme in previous commentaries has 
been Scotland’s (and the UK’s) weak productivity 
performance. 
The latest ‘trend’ data shows productivity growth 
ZDVHŎHFWLYHO\ŐDWRYHU4DQG4RI&KDUW
40.
Looking at the underlying data reveals what has 
been driving the swings in productivity in recent 
times.
Remember, labour productivity measures how well 
output is fairing relative to changes in how much 
labour is being used to produce that output. If we 
are able to produce more for the same amount of 
hours worked then we are more productive. On 
the other hand, if we are working harder but not 
producing much more, then our productivity will fall.
As Chart 41 highlights, it is changes in the hours 
that we are working that has been the main source 
of much of any positive movements in Scotland’s 
productivity performance. That is, rather than 
producing much more output, we are instead 
working less. 
Chart 42 highlights changes in Scottish productivity 
since 1998. Some interesting patterns emerge.
Over the period 1998 to 2004 Scotland experienced 
strong growth in productivity driven by healthy 
growth in output and little change in hours worked. 
[Phase 1]
This was then followed by a period of growth in both 
output and hours worked, so that productivity as a 
ZKROHUHPDLQHGUHODWLYHO\ŐDW>3KDVH@
'XULQJWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLVDQGVXEVHTXHQW
recession, output slipped back, but this was more 
than matched by a fall in hours worked. As a result, 
productivity increased. [Phase 3]
But since 2010, productivity in Scotland has barely 
moved. [Phase 4]
The weak growth we have seen in output has been 
PDWFKHGE\JURZLQJKRXUVZRUNHG,QHŎHFWWKH
growth in output witnessed over the last seven or 
eight years or so has come from there being more 
people in work – or working longer hours – rather 
WKDQDQ\LPSURYHPHQWLQHőFLHQF\
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Chart 43: Scottish productivity compared to the UK, 1998 - 2017
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Chart 44: Scottish Gross Disposable Household Income per 
head, Index UK=100
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Chart 45: Scottish, UK, EU and OECD productivity since 2000
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How has Scotland been comparing to the UK and 
internationally?
Chart 43 compares Scotland’s labour productivity 
level with that of the UK (with for ease the UK = 100). 
A quick glance shows that productivity in Scotland 
has risen from 92% of the UK rate in 1998, to 97% in 
2017. 
But on closer inspection, note that a substantial 
element of this ‘closing of the gap’ stems from what 
KDSSHQHGGXULQJWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV
Between 2007 and 2010, the gap between Scotland 
and the UK closed by 6.3 percentage points. 
This closing of the gap matches to Phase 3 in 
Chart 42 – that is, the fall in output was more than 
matched by a fall in hours worked. 
,QHŎHFW6FRWODQGORVWPRUHMREVGXULQJWKH
ŏQDQFLDOFULVLVSHUXQLWRIRXWSXWWKDQWKH8.GLG
hence our ‘productivity’ improved. 
As a result, whilst it might be possible to claim that 
we ‘have caught up’ a little with the UK, in terms of 
better economic outcomes this is highly debatable. 
Chart 44 shows that in terms of household income 
per head, there has been no substantial change in 
relative performance between Scotland and the UK 
as a whole. Indeed if anything it has got worse. 
People in Scotland might be relatively ‘more 
productive’ but this has been eroded by other 
means, including weaker growth in working hours.
On an international basis, productivity in Scotland 
remains around 20% lower than the top quartile of 
OECD countries (remember the Scottish Government 
has a target to be in the top quartile). 
6FRWWLVKSURGXFWLYLW\KDVHŎHFWLYHO\ŐDWOLQHGVLQFH
2010. In contrast, productivity across the OECD and 
EU has been on the rise.
Turning around this productivity performance is 
crucial for boosting wages in the long-run. For all 
the debate about ‘economic wellbeing’, ultimately 
solving the productivity puzzle will go a long way to 
help improve outcomes. 
21 Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 46: Changes in the Fiscal Resource budget (£m, 2018/19 
prices)
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Chart 47: Growth in PAYE employment earnings per capita
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Chart 48: Share of SG Budget devoted to health
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Scottish Budget 2019-20: what next?
In February, the Scottish Budget for 2019-20 
secured safe passage through Parliament. Once 
again, much of the debate focussed upon income 
tax rates and local government budgets. But longer-
term trends are emerging which are starting to exert 
DJUHDWHULQŐXHQFHRQWKH6FRWWLVKEXGJHW
In the end, as a result of additional consequentials 
IURPVSHQGLQJRQWKH1+6LQ(QJODQGWKHŏVFDO
envelope Mr Mackay had at his disposal for 2019-20 
ZDVEHWWHUWKDQŏUVWWKRXJKW&KDUW
But the story on devolved revenues was less 
positive. In particular, Scotland’s income tax 
revenues are now forecast to grow much more 
slowly. The net budget position for 2019-20 was 
WKHUHIRUHŐDW
The focus once again on a 1-year budget allowed 
some emerging risks to be glossed over. Of 
particular concern from a Scottish perspective is this 
emerging outlook for devolved income taxes, with 
earnings growth lagging the rest of the UK. Chart 47. 
So, although Scottish taxpayers are paying £500m 
more in income tax relative to what they would be 
paying if the government set the same policy as in 
rUK, the Scottish Government is only on track to 
collect around £180m more in 2019-20. The rest has 
been eaten up by weaker growth in the tax base.
On top of this, it is increasingly likely that the tax 
IRUHFDVWVIRUWKHŏUVWWZR\HDUVRILWVGHYROXWLRQ
2017/18 and 2018/19 – were too optimistic. Based 
upon current data, the Scottish Government could 
be forced to repay around £600m. 
On the spending side, the NHS was once again the 
big ‘winner’. But with health soon to absorb around 
half of day-to-day spending, the pressure on ‘non-
protected’ areas continues to build. Chart 48. 
2QHUHŐHFWLRQLVWKDWZKLOVWSROLWLFLDQVDUHKDSS\
to set out their spending aspirations, not enough 
is said about their plans for non-prioritised areas. 
After a decade of austerity, a strategy is needed for 
managing reductions in certain areas just as much 
as one for where new money should be spent.  
In May, the government will publish its latest 
PHGLXPWHUPEXGJHWIRUHFDVWV7KLVZLOORŎHUDQ
insight into the current administration’s thinking 
on such issues. With an election 2 years away it will 
be incumbent on all political parties to set out their 
own approaches. 
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Chart 49: FAI Business Monitor - volume of repeat and new 
business, 2014 - 2019
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Chart 50: FAI Business Monitor - business costs and turnover, 
2014 - 2019 
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Chart 51: Natwest regional Purchasing Managers Index, Jan 
2016 - March 2019
40
45
50
55
60
65
2016 2017 2018 2019
P
u
rc
h
a
s
in
g
 M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
 I
n
d
e
x
 (
>
5
0
 =
 e
x
p
a
n
s
io
n
)
Scotland London S. East S. West
East Wales W. Midlands E. Midlands
Yorkshire N. East N. West N. Ireland
Other UK regions and devolved nations
UK
Source: IHS Markit / Natwest
Latest economic indicators
Similar to at the UK level, most current indicators of 
business and consumer sentiment show high levels 
of uncertainty. 
Whether or not this turns into a fall back in activity 
remains unclear. 
Our latest Scottish Business Monitor for Q1 2019 
showed that whilst activity remained net positive 
across the economy, it was less positive than 
3-months ago. Chart 49. 
New business activity has fallen back and now sits 
at its lowest point since the end of 2016. 
$ORQJVLGHWKLVŏUPVDUHUHSRUWLQJWKDWFRVWVDUH
rising faster than turnover, with the gap widening; 
something which has in the past been a useful early 
indicator of a slowdown in economic activity.  Chart 
50.
The latest PMI for Scotland showed a similar picture. 
)RU0DUFKWKHŏJXUHZDVóMXVWEHORZWKHFXW
RŎSRLQWEHWZHHQH[SDQVLRQDQGFRQWUDFWLRQ7KLV
was the 4th month in a row that activity reports have 
been marginally negative. Chart 51.
Sentiment amongst small businesses appears 
particularly negative at the current time. Chart 52.
2QHFRPPRQWKHPHWKDWZHKDYHLGHQWLŏHGLVWKDW
whilst activity levels may be in the balance, there 
is clear and sustained negative sentiment toward 
investment. The Scottish Business Monitor reported 
a negative balance of -7 on capital investment. 
Chart 52: FSB Small Business Confidence Index, Q2 2012 - Q1 
2019
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Chart 53: GfK consumer confidence index, Jan 2016 - March 
2019
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Chart 54: Scottish household expectations of economy and 
household finances, Q2 2013 - Q1 2019
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Chart 55: Scottish and UK retail sales growth, Q1 2016 - Q4 
2018
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Similar trends appear in the latest household 
surveys. 
7KHODWHVWFRQVXPHUFRQŏGHQFHLQGLFDWRUSURYLGHG
by GfK was -19. Chart 53
Optimism appears to be particularly negative 
amongst those at the lower end of the household 
income distribution. 
The Scottish Government’s own Scottish Consumer 
Sentiment Indicator – a composite measure based 
on a survey of households’ current sentiment and 
future expectations of economic performance, 
KRXVHKROGŏQDQFHVDQGDWWLWXGHVWRVSHQGLQJ
money – fell to its lowest value since the survey was 
ŏUVWFRQGXFWHGLQ&KDUW
In Q1 2019, the Indicator stood at -9.6. Compared 
to Q4 2018, the indicator decreased by a further 3.8 
points, implying that sentiment notably weakened. 
The fall was driven by a weakening across all major 
LQGLFDWRUVRIFRQŏGHQFHZLWKWKHHFRQRPLFRXWORRN
weighing particularly heavily on the results.
Scotland’s retail sector had a slightly better end to 
the year, with growth of 0.8% in the quarter. Despite 
troubles for a number of high street retailers, 2018 
marks the 10th year of consecutive growth since the 
recession.
Overall however, the sector has been lagging behind 
the pace of growth in the rest of GB. This is likely to 
be explained, in part, by the ongoing challenges in 
household earnings. Chart 55.
One positive note remains once again the outlook 
for the labour market. The RBS Jobs Indicator was 
60.1 (where >50 marks improvement). Chart 56.
Chart 56: Royal Bank of Scotland employment barometer, March 
2007 - March 2019 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
March 2007 March 2009 March 2011 March 2013 March 2015 March 2017 March 2019
B
a
ro
m
e
te
r
Barometer 12m Moving Average
Source: IHS Markit / RBS 
24Economic Commentary, April 2019
Chart 57: How has the UK’s decision to leave the European 
Union affected……
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Chart 58: In the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal, 
do you believe that your company is prepared for this ‘no deal’ 
Brexit?
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Chart 59: What do you expect the impact of a ‘no deal’ Brexit to 
be for your business in the following areas?
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Brexit readiness
As part of our ongoing work to monitor 
developments in the Scottish economy, earlier this 
6SULQJZHDVNHGDQXPEHURIŏUPVóIURPDFURVV
6FRWODQGDQGIURPGLŎHUHQWVHFWRUVóDERXWWKHLU
preparations for Brexit (and their experience so far).  
The focus was not on whether businesses believe 
Brexit to be good or bad, but instead, how Brexit is 
DŎHFWLQJGLŎHUHQWDUHDVRIWKHLUGD\WRGD\DFWLYLWLHV
such as investment and recruitment. 
Firstly, we wanted to see if any Brexit related 
uncertainty has been having an impact on 
LQYHVWPHQWUHFUXLWPHQWDQGŏUPVXQGHUWDNLQJQHZ
projects at the current time. Chart 57.
Four in ten reported that Brexit has had a negative 
impact on their current investment activity while 
only one in ten say it has been positive. Furthermore 
almost half of companies say that it has had a 
negative impact on new investment.
6HFRQGO\ZHZHUHDOVRLQWHUHVWHGLQZKHWKHUŏUPV
had made plans for a possible ‘no deal’ Brexit. Chart 
58.
7KHRYHUZKHOPLQJUHVSRQVHZDVWKDWŏUPVVWLOOGR
not feel fully prepared for a potential ‘no deal’ Brexit 
outcome. Whilst this is not that surprising given the 
uncertainties that currently exist, the scale of the 
response is clearly a concern.
Thirdly, we asked businesses about their 
expectations of the impact of ‘no deal’ Brexit. Chart 
59.
45% fear it would have a negative impact on their 
access to skilled labour and more than 35% expect 
a negative impact with respect to their access 
WRŏQDQFH2QO\DURXQGVDLGWKH\IRUHFDVWD
positive impact.
Finally, in relation to any potential impacts on 
export competitiveness and imports, again negative 
expectations outweigh positive ones.  
The mood of Scottish Businesses around a no-deal 
Brexit right now is fairly negative, which appears to 
EHKDPSHULQJLQYHVWPHQWLQQHZEXVLQHVVQHZVWDŎ
and new equipment. 
Whilst there are increasing signs of preparations 
ramping up, there are still a number of companies 
who have not done this.
25 Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 6: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy
2019 2020 2021
Bank of England 1.2% 1.5% 1.9%
OBR 1.2% 1.4% 1.6%
NIESR 1.5% 1.7% 1.7%
European Commission 1.3% 1.3% -
IMF 1.5% 1.6% 1.6%
Oxford Economics 1.4% 1.9% -
ITEM Club 1.3% 1.6% -
CBI 1.4% - -
Source: HM Treasury, Bank of England, OBR
Chart 60: FAI forecast scenarios
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Table 7:  FAI forecast growth scenarios, %, 2019 to 2021
2019 2020 2021
Business Investment unlocked 1.7% 1.8% 1.6%
Central Forecast 1.1% 1.4% 1.5%
No deal max policy response -0.2% -0.3% 1.3%
No deal no policy response -2.1% -1.5% 1.4%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Our forecasts
Economic forecasting in the midst of this current 
uncertainty continues to be fraught with issues. 
As a result, all economic forecasts need to be viewed 
with caution. We simply do not know how decisions 
in Westminster or Brussels will pan out. Nor do we 
have any precedent to fall back on to give guidance 
on what the economic impacts might be.  
Moreover, the smoothness, or otherwise, of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU is but one step in the 
process. Negotiations on the terms of the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU have yet to begin in earnest. 
In the light of all this, we present a series of scenarios 
for how the Scottish economy may evolve over the 
next three years.
As with any such scenarios, the exact point estimates 
are less important than the overall scale and direction 
of travel.  
In our central forecast, we continue to assume 
that the UK makes an orderly departure from the 
EU, although uncertainty continues to impact on 
investment and private sector spending decisions 
for some time yet. 
As a result, and in light of the weakening outlook 
for investment, we have lowered our forecast a little 
to 1.1% for 2019 and 1.4% and 1.5% for 2020 and 
2021. 
For our other scenarios, we take the impact point as 
Q2 2019. In reality, the impacts will occur at some 
as yet to be determined point in 2019. Starting at Q2 
is simply for illustrative purposes to show the range 
of outcomes. 
Whilst the immediate risk of a ‘no-deal’ outcome 
has been pushed back, it remains a possibility at 
some point in 2019. There is huge uncertainty over 
how this might look, the timing of when this might 
happen, and how the economy might respond. 
We have therefore developed an illustrative ‘worst’ 
case scenario where the UK leaves in a disorderly 
fashion. If this was to occur, output could fall by 
around 5.5% from peak to trough (with a fall of 2.1% 
in 2019 as a whole compared to 2018). These are 
similar to the range of numbers produced by the 
Bank of England. 
26Economic Commentary, April 2019
Chart 61: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth range
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* Actual data to 2018. Central forecast with forecast uncertainty 
for 2019 – 2021. Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of 
SDVWIRUHFDVWVDWGLŎHUHQWIRUHFDVWKRUL]RQV
Table 8:  FAI central forecast Scottish GDP growth 2019 to 2021
2019 2020 2021
GDP 1.1% 1.4% 1.5%
Production 1.2% 1.6% 1.7%
Construction 1.0% 1.1% 1.1%
Services 1.1% 1.4% 1.4%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 9: FAI Labour Market forecasts to 2021
2019 2020 2021
Employment rate (%)1 75.1% 75.0% 74.8%
Unemployment Rate (%)2 3.8% 3.9% 4.1%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
1 Rate calculated as total employment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16-64. 2 Rate calculated 
as total unemployment divided by total of economically active 
population aged 16 and over.
However, this assumes no policy response from 
government or the Bank of England. This is clearly 
unrealistic. 
What a policy response to a ‘no deal’ Brexit 
might look like is uncertain. It is likely to involve 
DVLJQLŏFDQWPRQHWDU\VWLPXOXVWKURXJKDFXWLQ
interest rates and possibly further Quantitative 
Easing. 
$ŏVFDOVWLPXOXVLVDOVROLNHO\ZLWKDQXSOLIWLQ
spending – possibly on infrastructure – and, as in 
2008, a temporary reduction in certain tax rates to 
support domestic spending. 
Even then, and assuming a policy stimulus relatively 
comparable to that in 2008/2009, the economy 
is still likely to take a negative hit, but on a much 
smaller scale. 
In that scenario, the Scottish economy would face 
a peak to trough decline of just over 1.9% before 
picking back up. 
Of course, should the policy stimulus be bigger or 
smaller, then the exact number would change. On 
any reasonable assumption however, the scale 
of the ‘hit’ to the economy is likely to be much 
less than some of the ‘worst’ case scenarios have 
suggested. 
Of course, there is a ‘best’ case scenario, where the 
UHFHQWXQFHUWDLQW\LVUHGXFHGDQGFRQŏGHQFHUHWXUQV
to the economy. In such a situation, we are likely 
WRVHHDVLJQLŏFDQWVSLNHLQQHZLQYHVWPHQWDQGLQ
wider spending in the economy. 
7KLVFRXOGUHŐHFWIRUH[DPSOHFODULW\RQWKH
UK’s future relationship with the EU, including a 
commitment to close economic ties in some form or 
another. 
In such an instance, we think that growth could 
surprise on the upside and be much closer to trend 
in 2019 and 2020.
Based on our central scenario, our latest nowcasts 
suggest that growth will be 0.31% in Q1 2019. 
Further information on some of the nowcasting work 
in the FAI is given in the box overleaf.
The central secnario is driven by solid growth in 
production and services, and a forecast pick up in 
construction activity after zero growth in 2018. 
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Box 1. Regional Nowcasting
Nowcasting involves the use of statistical models to 
estimate the current value of a variable of interest, 
most commonly economic growth, but these 
methods are also used by central banks and others 
WRHVWLPDWHFXUUHQWUDWHVRILQŐDWLRQDQGRWKHU
macroeconomic features. The basic idea is to use 
timely indicators of economic activity to produce 
more timely (and in some cases higher frequency) 
estimates of macroeconomic variables. 
Researchers in the FAI are involved in two 
nowcasting projects.
7KHŏUVWUXQQLQJVLQFHXVHVD6FRWODQG
only model and makes use of a range of ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ indicators of activity in the Scottish economy 
to understand what the current rate of economic 
growth in the Scottish economy is. 
These results are reported on the FAI blog, as well as 
the project blog (http://www.nowcastingscotland.
com). 
The latest estimates are for Q1 2019, and these 
put economic growth in Scotland at 0.31%, or at an 
annualised rate 1.26%.
7KLVLVVWLOOVLJQLŏFDQWO\EHORZWUHQGJURZWKLQ
6FRWODQGEXWLQOLQHZLWKWKHDYHUDJHRőFLDO
estimate of quarter to quarter growth in 2018.
7KHVHFRQGSURMHFWLVIXQGHGE\WKH2őFHIRU
National Statistics (ONS) through the Economic 
Statistics Centre of Excellence, and produces 
quarterly estimates of growth for the UK regions 
and nations to the same approximate timescale 
as estimates produced by the ONS for the UK as a 
ZKROH2őFLDOHVWLPDWHVRIJURZWKLQIRUWKH
UK regions and nations will be released in December 
2019. For more on this nowcasting work see: 
https://www.escoe.ac.uk/regionalnowcasting/. 
UK growth is currently available to 2018 Q4, as are 
these nowcast estimates, which are summarised in 
WKHWDEOHEHORZWKH8.ŏJXUHLQEROGLVWKHRőFLDO
estimate from the ONS).
Table 10: Growth rate (%) in the year to 2018 Q4
Area Growth rate
London 2.90%
Scotland 1.70%
North West 1.50%
South West 1.50%
East Midlands 1.40%
UK 1.40%
South East 1.30%
Yorkshire and The Humber 1.20%
West Midlands 1.10%
North East 1.00%
East of England 0.90%
Northern Ireland 0.90%
Wales 0.80%
Source: Fraser of  Allander Institute 
We can see that London continued to far outperform 
the rest of the UK in 2018, realising growth more 
than twice as fast as the UK as a whole. Meanwhile 
Scotland, the North West, South West and East 
Midlands saw growth in 2018 slightly faster than 
the UK as a whole. Lagging substantially behind the 
UK as a whole were Wales, Northern Ireland and the 
East of England.
Nowcasting provides a toolkit to estimate economic 
growth (and other features of the macroeconomy) in 
a more timely, and in some cases higher frequency, 
PDQQHU7KHUHDUHRIFRXUVHFRQŏGHQFHLQWHUYDOV
around any such estimates, as there are around all 
RőFLDOHFRQRPLFVWDWLVWLFVDQGIRUWKLVUHDVRQ
these estimates should be treated as (hopefully 
useful!) early estimates measured with some 
uncertainty. 
1RWH7KHŏJXUHVIRU6FRWODQGZHUHSURGXFHGDIWHUWKH
ŏUVWUHOHDVHRIWKH8.ŏJXUHIRU4DQGZLOOEH
GLŎHUHQWWRWKHRőFLDO6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWHVWLPDWHV
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Policy context
Policy priorities in light of Brexit
Next month will mark the 20th anniversary of the 
ŏUVWHOHFWLRQVWRWKHGHYROYHG6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW
7KHUHZLOOQRGRXEWEHVRPHUHŐHFWLRQRQWKH
successes and failures of the parliament since then. 
But whatever your view, it is hard now to imagine 
Scotland and Scotland’s economy without Holyrood 
playing a central role. 
7KHVLJQLŏFDQFHRIWKLVUROHLVRQO\OLNHO\WRLQFUHDVH
in the years ahead. With Brexit, major structural 
shifts in our economy, the continuing recovery from 
a decade of austerity and the possibility of a 2nd 
independence referendum, further upheaval is 
inevitable. 
The immediate policy challenges
%UH[LWLVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWLQŐHFWLRQSRLQWLQ8.
economic policy making since 1979. 
:KLOVWZHVWLOOGRQRWNQRZWKHŏQDORXWFRPHLI
(and when) the UK does eventually leave the EU, it 
will also be the biggest single test of the capacity 
and capability of the Scottish Parliament since 
1999. 
We see three major challenges on the immediate 
horizon. 
Firstly, even if there is progress toward some form 
of Withdrawal Agreement between now and the end 
RI2FWREHUWKHXOWLPDWHHQGVWDWHLQWHUPVRIDŏQDO
deal with the EU remains uncertain. 
Many critical elements of the negotiations over a 
future UK-EU relationship are likely to be fudged 
or deferred, leaving uncertainty hanging over the 
economy for many more months, if not years. 
Businesses and policymakers will have to adapt to a 
world where uncertainty is a constant feature of the 
landscape. 
Of course, much of the onus for providing greater 
clarity to the economic policy context rests with the 
UK Government.
But it is also a challenge for Scottish policymakers. 
If uncertainty is the new normal, then a clarity of 
purpose on devolved policy, whether that be in 
setting out a clear direction of travel on devolved 
taxation, infrastructure, planning and wider 
economic development, becomes all the more 
important. 
The second challenge relates to how the Scottish 
Parliament will respond to the new powers that will 
come its way as a result of the UK leaving the EU.  
But what might these powers be? 
The lack of progress in determining the split 
between devolved and reserved responsibilities 
of (ex-)EU powers is frustrating and only adds to 
the uncertainty. This is one area where the UK 
Government could make (and should have made) 
much quicker progress. 
There is also a major question about how future 
Scottish governments might use these new powers? 
Whilst it is understandable that the Scottish 
Government will make the political case for the 
maximum transfer of powers, it needs to consider 
carefully how such powers will be administered, 
funded and used for what purpose. 
In recent weeks, we have seen the delivery of some 
new devolved social security powers pushed back 
into the next decade given the complexities of 
administration and delivery. 
Finally, there is simply no escaping the fact that the 
decision to leave the EU marks the greatest shake-
up to the UK’s economy and policy landscape in over 
40 years. 
Much of what was taken as ‘given’ in economic 
policy circles – e.g. freedom of movement, Single 
Market access, EU structural funding, State Aid 
rules, Horizon 2020 – looks like it will be turned on 
its head. 
With so much of recent debates still stuck either 
on the arguments for and against Brexit, the 
‘type of Brexit’ or indeed the process, the lack of 
any detailed thinking as to what UK and Scottish 
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economic policy might look like post-Brexit is a 
concern. 
Scotlands domestic policy agenda
One consequence of the Brexit debate is that it 
has left little room for discussions of the emerging 
structural challenges and opportunities our 
economy is facing.   
So what are these big policy questions? 
First and foremost, the sustainable growth 
challenge is arguably still something that remains 
inadequately addressed in the political discourse in 
Scotland. 
For all our economy’s documented successes, the 
backdrop is an economy that has grown slowly for 
the best part of a decade. 
:HKDYHFOHDUVWUHQJWKVLQVHFWRUVDQGŏUPVDFURVV
6FRWODQGIURPIRRG	GULQNŏQDQFLDOVHUYLFHV
energy and tourism. Our workforce is highly skilled 
with our university sector world class. 
But we also know that our export base is too 
narrow and that our levels of R&D activity and 
entrepreneurship lag behind the UK as a whole 
(which in turn lag behind key OECD economies).
For all the talk about ‘inclusive growth’, nearly 1 in 
4 children in Scotland continue to live in poverty. 
Indeed, the policy response in support of this 
asserted vision remains opaque at best. 
And despite record levels of employment, for many 
being in work is no longer providing the security and 
prosperity it once did. In-work poverty is on the rise, 
with over 50% of those in poverty now living in a 
household where there is at least one working adult. 
In some areas, such as renewables and climate 
change, the government has overachieved on the 
ambitious targets that they set themselves. But 
on the major ‘macro’ targets – such as the 2007 
‘Purpose Targets’ – most have been missed.  
Last year we highlighted the ‘cluttered landscape’ 
here in Scotland, with numerous strategies, advisory 
boards, action plans, agencies and small-scale 
initiatives. It would appear that little has changed. 
But this is not just a challenge for the Scottish 
Government. In November 2017, and as part of their 
Industrial Strategy, the UK Government announced a 
review of how UK and Scottish Government agencies 
could better collaborate to support businesses. 
1HDUO\PRQWKVRQWKLVUHYLHZKDV\HWWRRŎHUDQ\
insights, recommendations, or even any evidence of 
KDYLQJJRWRŎWKHJURXQG
The lack of evaluation and scrutiny of the 
HŎHFWLYHQHVVDQGYDOXHRISROLF\LQLWLDWLYHVUHPDLQV
– in our view - the weakest aspect of the devolution 
policy landscape. 
The second ‘big’ question relates to how the 
Parliament will respond to the major structural 
changes that we know are coming to our economy in 
the years ahead.  
Some have a particular resonance in Scotland, 
such as sharp rise in the average age of our 
population, the challenges of managing the long-
term scaling back in oil and gas or the advantages 
our natural environment can give us in a world where 
sustainability is rarely just an outcome of growth 
rates but a key driver. 
Others are more universal, such as understanding 
ERWKWKHEHQHŏWVDQGULVNVWRMREVKRXVHKROG
incomes and inequalities from the 4th industrial 
revolution and the growth of new and emerging 
markets.
Scotland’s economic strengths provide a solid 
foundation upon which to build. But in a world of 
VXFKVLJQLŏFDQWFKDQJHDQGVKLIWVõPRUHRIWKH
same’ policy ideas will not succeed. The scale of 
these changes will require a boldness in economic 
thinking that, arguably, we have not seen over the 
20 years of the Scottish Parliament. 
Finally, one thing that we can be certain of is that 
public sector budgets will remain under pressure for 
the foreseeable future. 
Whilst borrowing has fallen in recent years, the 
UK’s stock of debt still stands at nearly 90% of GDP. 
Should Brexit weaken the economy, this will hit tax 
revenues and lower the long-term rate of growth in 
public spending.  
As highlighted above, the near-term outlook for 
some devolved taxes is a further concern, with a gap 
emerging between forecasts and revenues raised. 
All this comes at a time when demand pressures 
continue to rise. Health is likely to absorb around 
half of day-to-day government spending by the 
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end of the parliament. And even then, this is just 
VXőFLHQWWRNHHSSDFHZLWKULVLQJWDNHXSDQGFRVWV
of delivery. 
As a result, future Scottish governments will have 
little room for manoeuvre, unless they are prepared 
to make radical changes to the way services are 
delivered, what services are delivered, and/or there 
is a step change in the level of revenues raised. 
2QHUHŐHFWLRQLVWKDWZKLOVWSROLWLFLDQVDUHKDSS\
to set out their spending aspirations, not enough is 
said about their vision for non-prioritised areas. 
Is Scottish society content for the changes in 
spending distribution we are seeing to continue? 
Can we make more transparent, strategic and 
consensual decisions about which areas to prioritise 
(and which are less of a priority)? And at what point 
do we need to become more realistic about the 
scope to raise additional public revenues to meet 
ambitions for public service delivery? 
So what next?
7KHDJHRIHFRQRPLFDQGŏVFDOXQFHUWDLQW\DQG
upheaval is clearly here to stay. This is the new 
normal to which we need to adapt.
Resilience, and an ambition to seek out new 
opportunities, are likely to be the two most in-
demand qualities for businesses and policymakers 
over the coming months and years. 
On a more long-term level, the Scottish Government 
– and opposition politicians – will need to 
understand and respond to the big structural 
HFRQRPLFDQGŏVFDOFKDOOHQJHVDQGFKDQJHVWKDW
are underway. 
So where might they focus? 
Firstly, there is clearly a much greater role for robust 
evaluation of policy than we have seen in recent 
years. What has worked? What has not? Why have 
some targets been met? And why have some been 
missed? 
Some institutions, like Scottish Enterprise, are 
aware of the need to do this and engage in a wide 
variety of appraisals and evaluations. But more 
broadly, challenges remain around the extent 
and quality of economic data, the public sector’s 
capacity to undertake such analysis, and – perhaps 
most concerning – the lack of recognition of the 
importance to good policymaking and accountability 
of evidence.  
Secondly, a renewed emphasis on medium term 
challenges is needed. This will require more 
strategic thinking about the likely economic and 
ŏVFDOFKDOOHQJHVRIWKHIXWXUHWKDQDSSHDUVWREH
the case just now.  The new Scottish Government 
\HDUŏQDQFLDOVWUDWHJ\LVDJRRGVWHSIRUZDUGEXW
LVXQGRQHE\WKHŏ[DWLRQWRRQH\HDUEXGJHWV
Thirdly, and most politically challenging, is that 
there needs to be more recognition that if Scotland 
is to respond to the structural shifts that will impact 
on our economy in the years ahead, it will need a 
more collegiate approach that seeks consensus 
on the big issues and what should be done to 
understand their implications. The last few weeks in 
Westminster have shown the consequences that can 
arise when consensus policymaking breaks down. 
20 years ago those who established the Scottish 
Parliament had the hope that politics here in 
6FRWODQGZRXOGWDNHDGLŎHUHQWDSSURDFKDQGXVKHU
LQDQHZHUDRIFROOHFWLYHHŎRUWDQGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
The need for that approach is now more urgent than 
ever.
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